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Abstract 
 
Derrida has been significantly misread by many management scholars.  The paper 
argues that his work is not ‘postmodernist’; further, that Habermas’ (1987) influential 
critique of Derrida’s  views on truth and politics have led to widespread but 
misleading views of his critical credentials. Although Habermas is not entirely 
misguided, a defence of Derrida is provided that sets out the potential for his work to 
inform management scholars who wish to provide emancipatory critique.    
DERRIDA REAPPRAISED: DECONSTRUCTION, CRITIQUE AND 
EMANCIPATION IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
 
Whilst the work of Jacques Derrida has a number of influential admirers amongst 
scholars of management and organization (Jones, forthcoming) there remains a 
significant degree of scepticism about the utility of his work, especially perhaps 
amongst those who wish to change the world in ways they consider to be 
emancipatory (Feldman, 1998).  Indeed, for Gabriel, deconstruction is opposed to 
such ambitions: 
 
[o]ur theories [i.e. those of management scholars] have mostly given up 
on the Marxist ideal of changing the world and even on the more modest 
one of understanding and critiquing it. Instead they increasingly seek to 
‘deconstruct’ it through ironic or iconic engagement, endlessly lost in 
narrative vortices 
Gabriel (2001, p.23). 
  
Even some scholars who are generally read as sympathetic to Derrida’s work have 
suggested that emancipatory critique has to be added on to deconstruction as a 
supplement to Derrida’s own concerns. For example, Boje feels that it is necessary “to 
marry deconstruction to the critical theory revival of Marxist critique of ideology … 
[otherwise] deconstruction became (sic) just another formalism, anti-historical, 
politically conservative, and … lacking a social change project” (2001, p.18/19). 
Nevertheless, Derrida himself has said he believes that 
 
there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all 
domains and all the areas of the world and society … I must say that I 
have no tolerance for those who - deconstructionist or not - are ironical 
with regard to the grand discourse of emancipation 
Derrida (1996, p.82).  
 
The principal aim of this paper is to argue for a reappraisal of Derrida’s potential to 
contribute to emancipatory critique in management and organization studies.  A 
contribution that I suggest can be substantial. Indeed, it is submitted that 
emancipatory ambitions are not alien to deconstruction as Boje (2001) seems to claim 
- rather they are intrinsic to it.  
 
 
THE DERRIDA DEBATE 
 
At least since Derrida’s translation into English, the reception to his work has been 
tainted by its association with others. For example, Heidegger and de Man (the 
former, a major intellectual influence; the latter, in the 1970s to his death, a high-
profile supporter) were both alleged to have been complicit with Nazism. As 
Beardsworth comments, “Derrida’s reputation suffered through association, and the 
reach of his thinking was severely underestimated” (1996, p.3). Furthermore, Derrida 
is often classified as a ‘postmodernist’ - a label that he has never sought or welcomed; 
indeed Derrida considers that “the facile, demagogic, grave error of confusing my 
work (or even ‘deconstruction’ in general) with postmodernism is indicative … of a 
massive failure to read and analyze” (1999a, p.263/4).    
 
Whilst these assumptions about the nature of Derrida’s work have arisen more or less 
in spite of his texts, he has of course been critiqued as a major intellectual force in a 
sustained manner, notably for the purposes of management and organization studies in 
literary criticism (Eagleton, 1996), sociology (Giddens, 1979) and political science 
(Callinicos, 1989). However, perhaps the most influential critique for many who 
suspect Derrida’s critical credentials is that of Habermas’ as set out in his lectures, 
‘Beyond a temporalized philosophy of origins:  Jacques Derrida’s critique of 
phonocentrism’ (1987, pp.161-184) and the ‘Excursus on leveling (sic) the genre 
between philosophy and literature’ (1987, pp.185-210).   It is the (misleading) 
Habermasian allegations about Derrida’s views, which according to him, lead to 
Derrida’s  
 destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-
construction of all the significations … [p]articularly the signification of 
truth (p.164) … [the] mystification of palpable social pathologies (p.181) 
… [and] Derrida’s recommendation, [that] philosophical thinking be 
relieved of the duty of solving problems  
Habermas (1987, p.210)  
 
that has probably been most significant in rendering plausible a quite widespread view 
of Derrida within some circles of organization scholars (and of course more widely). 
A view that is summed up well by Hancock and Tyler: 
 
the deconstructionist rejection of a realist ontology, combined with a 
concomitant suspicion of the metanarratives of truth and emancipation in 
Derrida’s work is, as Kumar (1995, p.131) notes, so ‘relentlessly 
subversive that it subverts itself ’ 
Hancock and Taylor (2001, p.27). 
 
The paper seeks to challenge this view of Derrida, starting with a brief consideration 
of critiques that are simply dismissive of Derrida - poking fun at his work rather than 
making an attempt to engage with it seriously and on its own terms. While these are 
likely to be trivial in a substantive sense, they are significant nonetheless in that they 
have established an environment in which a crude caricature of Derrida’s work (both 
false and damaging) has gained significant credence, not just in university barrooms 
but even in prestigious peer reviewed journals. But it is Habermas’ critique that is 
primarily engaged, in order to show what I think Derrida is up to in relation to truth 
and his views of emancipation that follow. The paper ends with a consideration of 
how, in the light of the arguments presented, Derrida’s insights might make a 
contribution to emancipation in organizations. 
 
Derrida Dismissed:  The Cambridge Affair and Intellectual Impostures 
 
The extent of the debate, indeed, the outright hostility Derrida has attracted over the 
years is well illustrated by an account of two specific events: the so-called Cambridge 
affair and the publication of Intellectual Impostures. Neither did anything but dismiss 
Derrida’s views but they are significant in that they both provoked widespread 
controversy that went well outside the confines of academia and damaged Derrida’s 
reputation.   
 
The first, a debate Derrida himself called the “Cambridge affair” (1995, p.419), 
occurred in 1992 when the University of Cambridge conferred an honorary degree on 
him, but only after a very close ballot amongst the staff. It provoked an openly hostile 
letter to The Times from an international group of distinguished philosophers. For 
them his work bore  
 
some of the marks of writing in … philosophy [but its influence has 
been] … to a striking degree almost entirely in fields outside philosophy 
- in departments of film studies, for example, or of French or English 
literature. // In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among those 
working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the world, M. 
Derrida’s work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour … 
Many [of his writings] … seem to consist in no small part of elaborate 
jokes and the puns “logical phallusies” and the like … where coherent 
assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial. Academic 
status based on what seem to us to be little more than semi-intelligible 
attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we 
submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a 
distinguished university  
(extracted from full letter cited in Derrida 1995, pp.419/21)  
 
These insultingly dismissive attacks seem not to have been made after a considered 
and sustained effort to understand Derrida’s work. Rather, the affair is more likely to 
be symptomatic of a wider debate - the lack of understanding between two distinct 
approaches to philosophy that (especially in the USA and UK) divide professional 
philosophers (Baggini & Stangroom, 2002). The dominant approach in Anglo-
American countries, ‘analytical philosophy’, tends to be hostile to so-called 
‘continental philosophy’ and each camp takes little interest in the debates of the other 
except to dismiss them. (Although, according to Baggini & Stangroom, a gradual and 
limited rapprochement between the divide has been slowly taking place over the 
decade since the affair.) 
  
A few years later, Derrida’s work, along with that of other so-called postmodernists 
(with whom he was classified) was subject to wide and hostile media debate 
following the publication of Sokal and Bricmont’s high profile ‘demolition-job’ (as 
they put it) on French postmodernism: Intellectual Impostures. It should perhaps be 
noted that Sokal and Bricmont’s main focus as scientists was upon writers who, they 
argued, used mathematics ‘wrongly’: allegedly merely to impress and make their 
work appear more substantial. (For a more general exploration of the whole affair 
from a management studies perspective see Carr (2000).) This meant that almost all 
the direct criticism was reserved for thinkers other than Derrida. He did not appear 
except for one brief reference concerning an improvised response he made at a 
conference in 1966 to a question on Einstein (Derrida, 1999b), although he was 
caught, again by association, in the crossfire.   
 
The affair was covered widely in the U.K. broadsheet newspapers and programmes 
such as BBC Radio Four’s Start the Week during the summer of 1998 in a way that 
was highly sympathetic to Sokal and Bricmont. As Sturrock says:  
 
Lacan, Kristeva, Luce Irigarary, Bruno Latour, Baudrillard, Paul Virilio, Deleuze, 
Guattari and one or two lesser figures turn out not to know their mathematical arse 
from their physical elbow … while Jacques Derrida, on whom the authors could 
… find nothing to pin, responded [to the publication of Intellectual Impostures] 
with a seen-it-all-before sigh, ‘le pauvre Sokal’  
(Sturrock, 1998, p.8) 
 
Neither the Cambridge affair nor Intellectual Impostures were significant as direct 
attacks upon Derrida’s ideas. However, their importance was that they created or 
exacerbated an atmosphere in which often ridiculous caricatures of Derrida’s claims 
have been legitimised as received wisdom even in some academic journals of the 
highest status. To make matters worse, such caricatures are often presented in a style 
that would otherwise be unacceptable in academic writing - one suggesting that the 
only interest is to parody and insult - and furthermore to do so on the basis of 
secondary sources of questionable standing.   
 
So, for example, in a field in which some of my own work is located, health studies, 
even a journal that has a reputation for the utmost scientific rigour, The Lancet, Muir 
Gray (1999) was able to publish an article that is difficult to read as anything more 
than insulting and making fun of what he calls ‘postmodernism’. In a style that 
contrasts startlingly with other articles in the journal, the opening words of the piece 
are: “Postmodernism, like the elephant is easier to recognise than to define” (1999, 
p.1550).  
 
He goes on to detail allegations about the characteristics of postmodernism, some of 
which suggest a half-remembered version of Derrida (although he is never cited or 
even named): 
 
[t]he notions that everything is a text, that the basic material of texts, 
societies and almost anything is meaning, that meanings are there to be 
decoded or deconstructed...  
(Muir-Gray, 1999, p.1550) 
 
Similarly, Hodgkin (1996), writing a two-page article on the implications for 
medicine of postmodernism in The British Medical Journal, supports his central claim 
- that “[i]n a postmodern world anything goes” (1996, p.1568) - by citing just one 
book, Postmodernism for Beginners. It is difficult to conceive of any other issue on 
which these journals would tolerate such research standards. A state of affairs, 
incidentally that renders somewhat paradoxical Sokal’s claim that ‘postmodernists’ 
lack rigour in their writing.   
 
There will be no attempt to refute these claims - in themselves they are ridiculous. 
The point is that they illustrate how a damaging trivialisation of Derrida’s work has 
been legitimised (along with the work of other, mainly French, philosophers). These 
quite widespread attitudes mean that from the start, work based on Derrida’s ideas has 
an uphill battle to establish its worth.  
 
The Objection of Impenetrability 
 
One of the concerns that unites those who wish to rubbish Derrida’s work with some 
of those who have critiqued it as a significant intellectual force is what Habermas has 
referred to as Derrida’s “somewhat impenetrable discussion[s]” (1987, p.194). The 
philosophers writing to The Times about Derrida’s Cambridge degree saw his writing 
similarly, as “semi-intelligible”.   I am not without some sympathy for this general 
point.  
 
Derrida’s texts have posed me problems of reading and interpretation that I have 
rarely encountered in other writers and I do concede that personally some of his work 
(especially for example Derrida (1986)) has eluded me so far! Cooper (1989) has 
likened reading Derrida to solving a series of cryptic crossword clues and Derrida has 
said much the same sort of thing about his attempts at reading Heidegger:  “I am still 
trying to understand Heidegger … He is one of the thinkers who I am constantly 
unable to understand” (1999b, p. 82). 
 
However, as Cooper’s analogy with crossword clues implies, with effort, Derrida’s 
writing is comprehensible. Derrida’s difficult style is symptomatic of an ambition to 
use language to make it say things that it has not previously said (Howells, 2002). As 
Cooper says 
 
Derrida assumes that … a demand [for conventional academic 
coherence] may actually work against … genuine understanding … 
since it is implicitly grounded in the idea that knowledge is somehow 
already clearly structured for us in the ‘external world’ 
 (Cooper 1989, p.481) 
 
He often uses a writing style that he has called ‘paleonymy’ (Derrida, 1976) in which 
an old term is used for a new or revised concept:  ‘supplement’, ‘différance’, ‘writing’ 
etc.. All this however I read as deliberately ironic, in that it self-consciously draws 
attention to communication as a central problematic. So for example, Derrida’s use of 
the term ‘writing’ has sometimes been (mis)understood as valuing permanent 
inscription over ephemeral utterance (Weber, 1995).  But this is because its 
paleonymic sense has been missed. ‘Writing’ in its paleonymic sense expresses our 
logocentric desire to deny différance - it is simultaneously that which cannot be 
written or said, since it precedes and makes possible the act of speaking or the act of 
inscription of marks on paper as well as being therefore (aporetically) conventional 
writing or the speech.   
 
Thus, his difficulty does not arise from a perverse desire to be obscure nor to hide the 
ultimate lack of meaning in his texts as has been suggested by some of his sneering 
critics, nor does ‘difficulty’ in itself suggest a lack of coherence. Such a criticism risks 
also being highly a-historical, as it is clear that in some cases what was first seen as 
‘difficult’ becomes widely comprehensible for later generations.  Far from being 
logically incoherent then, Derrida’s ‘difficult’ style is consistent with his wider 
critique of logocentrism, of which the “accepted standards of coherence and rigour” 
(my italics) to which the letter to The Times draws attention are part.   In a sense then 
his style is a reflection of his wider arguments, in that the ‘style’ in itself challenges 
these accepted standards. Put differently, Derrida’s style, is illustrative of his claim 
that any “text is complicated, there are many meanings struggling with one another, 
there are tensions” (Derrida, 1999b. p.79).  He understands conventional modes of 
expression that appear to be straightforward as denials of these tensions and 
struggles. 
 
It is worth noting that some writers in management and organization studies have 
adapted Derrida’s critique of academic conventions that is made by the very style of 
the writing, as a part of their own attempts to convey resistance to the logocentric - 
and, for some (Calás and Smircich, 1991)  phallocentric - representational practices 
that have come to dominate modes of expression in management writing. A recent 
example that is a full-length book is Burrell (1997). The following marks: 
WARNING: LINEARITY KILLS  
first appear on page 8 in embolden upper case lettering isolated from and larger than 
the rest of the text, disrupting its ‘flow’. It is a formulation that is printed at regular 
intervals throughout the book. Burrell asserts that throughout the book he wants to 
“underplay the importance of developing an argument in a linear logical way” (1997, 
p.27) and the very layout of most of the book is intended to support this aim, with for 
example, its “two streams of textual material moving in opposite directions … [which 
will make the reader] confused at first but that is all to the good” (1997, p.33). 
 
Whilst it is tempting to conclude that Derrida’s style of writing may be a problem for 
his readers rather than for his ideas, what Derrida’s difficulty has contributed to (even 
if it is through his readers’ laziness) are occasions on which he has been (as far as he 
was concerned) purely and simply misunderstood. Given the time demanded to 
understand his texts it is not implausible to believe that those who have dismissed 
Derrida have done so on the basis of secondary texts or on a superficial reading of a 
limited amount of his work.  Perhaps more worryingly, there are hints of reliance 
upon secondary texts in some established management writers who are appreciative of 
Derrida. For example Boje says he has used “Derrida’s approach to deconstruction … 
“tamed ” by [the pedagogic text] Culler (1982)” (1995, p.1007). He leaves 
unexplained in what sense tamed is used.  
 
This reliance upon secondary sources to ‘tame’ Derrida also applies even to thinkers 
equally as influential as Derrida and has led to misleading and damaging claims being 
made about his views.  Which brings us to Habermas who says, “Jonathon Culler 
reconstructs in a very clear way the somewhat impenetrable discussion between 
Derrida and Searle … [f]rom this complex discussion, Culler selects ...” (1987, p.194) 
and Habermas goes on to attack Derrida’s (alleged) position of deconstructing 
philosophical texts with the tools of literary criticism, especially through a critique of 
‘style’. All of this part of his critique was explicitly based on a secondary source. As 
Howells says, Habermas’ claims drew 
 
an untypically curt and categorical response from Derrida: ‘Cela est 
faux’ (‘This is false’...). Habermas claims that Derrida’s arguments are 
circular, that Derrida believes all interpretations to be erroneous, and all 
understanding to be misunderstanding … Derrida denies that he has 
ever expressed such views  
(Howells, 1998, p.69) 
 
It is to Habermas’ critique that I now turn. Habermas’ arguments are detailed and 
complex so I will extract two of the basic charges against Derrida made by Habermas, 
which seem to me to be behind much of the suspicion about Derrida from those with a 
critical orientation towards social theory. First Derrida is accused of a subversive and 
anarchistic orientation with regard to truth and reason (1987, p.181/2) seen for 
example in his apparent attempts to dissolve the distinctions between logic and 
rhetoric, philosophy and literature. Second, Derrida is accused of preferring 
philosophy to politics; he is guilty of being inattentive to the social practices that 
surround texts.   
 
These two accusations are related: as Callinicos argues, what follows from a relativist 
orientation to truth is a compulsion to question the possibility of grounding any 
personal political commitments because the logic of the position on truth denies the 
means either to “analyse those existing social arrangements which he [Derrida] rejects 
or to justify this rejection by outlining some more desirable state of affairs” (1989, 
p.79). In other words deconstructionism’s relation to truth, read following Habermas, 
subverts all claims, even those Derrida himself explicitly makes in the name of 
emancipation.  
 
Let us now discuss the first charge about truth, leaving the second (though related) 
charge concerning emancipation to form the backdrop to the concluding section of the 
piece. The approach in these discussions is to develop the Habermasian argument 
with examples from management writing that seem to have been influenced by it and 
then defend Derrida’s position. 
 
DERRIDA SUBVERTING TRUTH? 
 
Derrida is regularly assumed to be a relativist in spite of his explicit denials (Derrida, 
1981a; 1999b). One of the reasons that Derrida can be thought of in this way I think is 
because of Habermas’ mistaken assertion: “Derrida’s purposely paradoxical statement 
that any interpretation is inevitably a false interpretation, and any understanding a 
misunderstanding” (1987, p.198). As we have seen, Derrida has denied ever saying 
this (though Culler’s (1982, pp.175-180) interpretation of Derrida uses a similar 
formulation to Habermas’). Related to this claim, Habermas also believes that Derrida 
seeks to subvert any distinction between literature and philosophy, logic and rhetoric. 
For Habermas this is further evidence of “the relativism of meaning Derrida is after” 
(1987, p.197).   
 
It seems plausible to suggest that it is following this sort of critique of Derrida that 
Feldman (1998) can offer a commentary upon a debate among four participants 
(Carter, 1995; Clegg, 1995; Jackson, 1995 and Parker (1995a and b)) conducted in 
Organization Studies which he says was “concerning the meaning of knowledge and 
truth” (1998, p.61). Feldman reads their arguments in the same sort of way that 
Habermas reads Derrida’s (and incidentally in the same way as Habermas reads 
Foucault’s) in that Feldman ascribes to Carter, Clegg, Jackson and Parker a position 
that “they have learnt from Foucault, Derrida and others that rationality is neither 
objective nor true … [t]hus all four debaters … assume that relativism in one form or 
another is the only acceptable social basis for organization theory” (1998, p.61). 
 
Habermas, in his critique of Derrida, is particularly anxious to defend philosophy 
from being read as if it were literature and I suggest that Habermas’ assertion of what 
he thinks the respective distinctions should be represent a good illustration of the 
contrasting orientations to truth between himself and Derrida. Derrida would not think 
Habermas wrong in asserting that there are differences between literature and 
philosophy. In my reading of him, Derrida accepts that there are differences in degree 
between (what is conventionally represented as) literature and (what is usually 
categorised as) philosophy (Derrida, 1992a). As Derrida says, 
 
it seems interesting to me to study certain discourses, those of Nietzsche 
or Valéry for example, that tend to consider philosophy as a species of 
literature. But I never subscribed to that notion and I have explained 
myself on this point. Those who accuse me of reducing philosophy to 
literature or logic to rhetoric (see for example, the latest book by 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity) have visibly and 
carefully avoided reading me  
(Derrida, 1995, p.218). 
 
Habermas appears to be critical of Derrida however, because Habermas wants to 
suggest a stronger difference between philosophy and literature - a difference in kind - 
an intrinsic or essentialist distinction between literature and philosophy. For 
Habermas philosophy must distinguish itself from poetry and other forms of literature 
because for him what is central in making philosophy philosophy is that, like science, 
it has to deal with “truth-validity” (1987, p.336) claims. While not denying that all 
language contains some literary and rhetorical elements, in Habermas’ view these 
must be ‘bridled’ for the purposes of reading philosophical discourse. (In a social 
science context, many would insist, in parallel to Habermas on philosophy, that 
research findings are different from literature because they must similarly be subject 
to scrutiny on the basis of ‘validity’.)  
 
Derrida is best defended from the allegation that he relativises the two forms of 
writing by suggesting that he has never sought to deny the distinctions traditionally 
made between literature and philosophy. Indeed deconstructive practices would not 
make sense unless distinctions and oppositions in texts were taken ‘seriously’. The 
focus of deconstruction is the detailed scrutiny of the precise points at which 
distinctions are invoked so that easy and comfortable assumptions about the 
implications of such distinctions cannot be made. Thus, in relation to literature and 
philosophy, Derrida can be read to be agnostic about the distinction per se, that is, he 
brackets off the question of whether or not they are intrinsically different in 
ontological terms (Hillis Miller, 1995). His interest is in seeing what invoking the 
distinction does - what has to be privileged and what has to be marginalised in order 
to make a strong distinction appear plausible.   
 
What Derrida argues is that the traditional distinction between these terms shows that 
dominant traditions in philosophy and science since Plato privilege theories of truth as 
mimesis (1981b, pp.171-252).   Truth as mimesis assumes the stability of language as 
an instrument with which to represent (or imitate) a pre-existing world which 
provides, as Derrida puts it, “the presumed possibility of a discourse about what is” 
(1981b, p.191).   
 
In order to maintain this position however, mimetic truth seekers must, as Habermas 
recognises, ‘bridle’ the literary aspects of philosophical/scientific discourse - 
metaphor, metonymy, myth and so on - which if allowed into such discourse would 
destabilize its claims to represent the world more or less unproblematically, that is as 
truth-validity. Habermas wants philosophy to achieve what Derrida has called “pure 
representation without metaphoric displacement” (1976, p.291) that enables “the 
inscription or transcription of the thing itself ” (Derrida, 1981b, p.191). The problem 
Habermas faces is that any such bridling is inherently arbitrary and Derrida is not 
prepared to countenance such a practice.  
 
This is not to say that Derrida discounts truth (in Habermas’ terms, validity claims). 
Indeed, Derrida affirms rather than denies truth and he says of his whole enterprise: 
 
it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a discourse 
against truth or against science. (This is impossible and absurd, as is 
every heated accusation on this subject.) And when one analyzes 
systematically the value of truth … it is not in order to return naively to a 
relativist or sceptical empiricism … I repeat, then, leaving all their 
disseminating powers to the proposition and the form of the verb:  we 
must have [il faut] truth 
(Derrida, 1981a, p.105; italics in original).   
 
I interpret Derrida as suggesting here that truth is a trivial notion - many statements 
are true (the grass is green, the sky is blue). Derrida’s emphasis is to show that ‘truths’ 
can only appear in language and in contexts of interpretation and that furthermore 
interpretations are always subsets of other truths. Contrary to Habermas, Derrida 
believes that language and context are always and inevitably slippery and 
uncooperative with us, even when we are writing philosophy or science, and this 
uncoopertiveness can only be ignored and marginalised (or bridled as Habermas 
might say). It cannot be done away with.  
 
For Derrida therefore, representational practices cannot be mimetic, they cannot 
represent things themselves, “in the first place because there is no thing itself” (1976, 
p.292). This statement is not a denial of the materiality of the universe; the point he is 
making is that our representational practices are always irredeemably implicated in 
the constitution of how we think of a ‘thing’ ‘itself’ so that a distinction between the 
imitated and the imitation breaks down (Hobson, 2001; von Glaserfield, 1991). For 
Derrida, ‘things’ cannot be understood in themselves without interpretation. Thus, we 
can never have access to one originary phenomenon ‘behind’ language that can 
simply be imitated. Truth can only aspire to be a simulacrum - imitating an imitation 
(Ronai, 1999).  
 
Thus Derrida’s interest is in questioning not truth per se but rather singular truth. He 
questions whether any interpretation can claim to have captured ‘the truth’ in the 
strong sense of the single, correct way of seeing things that are true. For Derrida ‘the 
truth’ in this strong sense is always undecidable, where, as he puts it, 
“[u]ndecidability is the competition between two determined possibilities or options, 
two determined duties” (1999b, p.79; my italics).   
 
Possibly encouraged by the dominance of the Habermasian relativistic reading of 
Derrida, some management commentators, including some of those friendly towards 
him (Chia, 1994; Wood, Ferlie & Fitzgerald, 1998) have conflated undecidability with 
indeterminacy. A conflation that Derrida has done nothing to encourage. Arguing for 
indeterminacy, at least as intrinsic to all meaning, seems to me to be a frontal attack 
on truth, meaning and value. Derrida’s undecidability as competition between two 
determinate options is by contrast, a defence of truth, meaning and value against 
indeterminacy on the one hand and against those who, like Habermas in his search for 
validity (precariously) aspires to find one truth about things as they really are (Payne, 
2000).   
 
So, in the language of social scientific research, contrary to Habermas, Derrida is 
more or less unconcerned with theory building in the orthodox sense of generating a 
standpoint (such as Habermas’ communicative action) from which to justify social 
criticism.   Indeed, deconstruction resists theory in this sense by constantly 
destabilising it and showing that there are always other ways of seeing things that are 
true. In as much as Derrida does theory, his concern is to show that theories must 
always be on guard against themselves because the problematics of language always 
render them unstable (Couzens Hoy, 1993).    
 
In summary, Habermas’ reading of Derrida on truth is misleading in that it sees his 
work too radically - as being ‘subversive’ of truth itself. Indeed, Habermas’ influential 
use of the term ‘subversive’ in relation to Derrida’s work may have accentuated the 
misleading effect. Derrida himself rarely claims to provide subversive readings 
although this term is regularly applied by some sympathetic management writers to 
describe what Derridean analyses can offer: see for example, Legge (1996) or 
Willmott (1998a). Derrida’s caution in relation to subversion I suspect is because 
subversion could imply overt negativity or hostility. Better terms might include 
destabilising, unsettling or discomposing, because, like the term deconstruction itself, 
they suggest that the ambition is not to launch a fatal attack against what claims to be 
‘true’ but to provide a more affirmative reading that could be welcomed by the 
proponents of the theories he examines - exploring what apparently authoritative 
claims have overlooked or repressed.  What Spivak (1999) has called a critical 
intimacy rather than the critical distance more orthodox in academic writing.  
 
 
DERRIDA AS POLITICAL QUIETIST? 
 
 
Habermas’ other major strand of critique (though the two are not disconnected), 
particularly prominent in management and related areas of social sciences is to read 
Derrida’s work as esoteric, playful and unconcerned with (if not in outright denial of) 
the experience of oppressive and other problematic manifestations of power. For 
Habermas, the practice of deconstruction might appear to be subversive but offers 
nothing to replace that which it destroys. Indeed, deconstruction may not even help us 
to ‘do’ subversion at all, because subversion implies a desire to change and 
deconstruction in a Habermasian reading demurs from thinking about how things 
could be different let alone better (Couzens Hoy, 1993). For Habermas then, Derrida 
 
degrades politics and contemporary history to the status of the ontic and 
the foreground, so as to romp all the more freely, and with greater wealth 
of associations, in the sphere of the ontological 
(Habermas 1987, p.181). 
 
Perhaps picking up on the associations suggested by Habermas’ ‘romp’, Kincheloe 
and McLaren lump Derrida together with Lyotard and Baudrillard as ‘ludic 
postmodernists’ to whom they argue, “critical researchers should assume a cautionary 
stance” (1998, p.271). It cannot be legitimate simply to ignore political and social 
questions which according to Habermas Derrida often does, or when discussing them 
to refer to them merely as ‘text’. Do terms of conventional political and sociological 
analysis then become signifiers, “the product of language games or temporary 
discursive stabilizations” as O’Doherty & Willmott (2001, p.464) have put it, rather 
than being the real ‘places’ or structures within society where oppression occurs, as is 
more conventionally assumed? If Habermas is correct, then surely Derrida veers 
dangerously towards offering an inherently bourgeois form of analysis, as there is 
nothing to connect it to ‘reality out-there’. Themes such as emancipation might be 
seen as texts open to deconstruction rather than as political praxis 
 
Especially in his early writing, Derrida rarely uses terms common in the standard 
lexicon of political radicalism and he has never written a work of political philosophy 
as such (Bennington, 2001). Perhaps for these reasons Habermas’ reading is plausible; 
indeed I think it needs to be admitted that an emancipatory project can be avoided 
after reading Derrida (especially, I think, early Derrida) in a way that could not be 
after a (conventional) reading of Marx (Elliott, 2000; Soper, 1996).  
 
However, I suggest that this non-emancipatory reading is possible because Derrida 
does not use the familiar signposts that have become conventional in conducting 
political debates. Derrida’s overall project resists the channelling of his ideas down 
the traditional tracks provided for us in the orthodox delineations between academic 
disciplines - including, in particular, their language practices. Deconstruction cannot 
be simply applied to politics because politics (as an academic subject and praxis) must 
itself be deconstructed (Jay, 1992). However, this stance carries the risk of being 
misunderstood by those who refuse to move outside the traditional conventions. I 
think Howells is correct in saying that deconstruction 
 
does arouse intense fear and hostility amongst many liberal or 
conservative thinkers precisely because it pulls the carpet out from under 
their feet: it questions the comfortable assumptions of common sense and 
replaces them with the questions themselves, rather than a new set of 
answers; it dismantles the liberal consensus, shows up its illogicalities 
and simplifications, but it puts no new ideology in its place; indeed, it 
argues that there is no firm ground or foundation to our most cherished 
preconceptions. Derrida, and perhaps you and I, may find this exciting 
and liberating, we may delight in the attempt to found an ethics and 
politics on [this basis] … but the accusations of nihilism, however 
misplaced, are hardly surprising 
(Howells, 1998, p.141/2).   
 
Indeed, some of the work of established scholars in organization and management 
who are strongly influenced by Derrida is open to be read as being non-emancipatory 
in the sense that no strong commitment to organizational change is overtly 
demonstrated.   Some of these writers can be read to be esoteric, pursuing interests out 
of intellectual curiosity rather than as part of some kind of left-leaning political or 
personal project. Even if it is granted that their emancipatory intentions are implicit, 
the ideas risk ‘doing’ nothing. So for example, Willmott, whilst appreciating what for 
him is its valuable subversion of the dominant ‘distal’ view of organizing, is justified 
in questioning how Cooper & Law’s (1995) analysis of ‘distal’ and ‘proximal’ views 
of organization  
 
can be of assistance in the practical, political process of changing the 
conditions - personal/political - that routinely impede its realization [i.e. 
that of ‘proximal’ thinking over ‘distal’] in everyday organizing practices  
(Wilmott, 1998a, p. 238). 
 
I have an even greater degree of sympathy with this sort of criticism, especially when 
authors influenced by Cooper & Law go beyond what might (sympathetically) be 
understood as a disinclination to advertise the emancipatory potential of their work 
and appear to commend its appropriation for what I take to be an opposing political 
project - management consultancy. For Chia, analysis influenced by Derrida is  
 
practically useful and relevant to practising managers. It would help 
practitioners understand better how they have come to develop deeply 
entrenched habits of thought which unnecessarily circumscribed the 
possibilities for action ...[it is thus] eminently, instrumentally usable  
(Chia, 2000, p.517/8).   
 Indeed, a version of Derridean ideas does seem to be relatively readily able to be 
appropriated in this sort of way.  For example, Gergen’s (1992) Derrida-influenced 
account of ‘postmodernism’ in organizations parallels that of Cooper & Burrell 
(1988) in many ways - for example, in its call for the need to abandon the search for 
one meaning.  However, while for the latter analysis the political agenda was to 
develop a radical critique of organizational power, for Gergen, the aim seems to be to 
enable managers to survive in a so-called postmodern climate, providing them with an 
intellectual framework within which organizational procedures might be adapted in 
the face of these cultural changes (Burrell, 1993; Hancock and Tyler, 2001).  
 
In spite of the tenor arguably to be found in some established Derrida-influenced 
work in management and organization, this passage from Derrida surely renders 
questionable - if not illegitimate - the use of deconstruction, except to change things in 
a radical and emancipatory direction: 
 
the most radical programs (sic) of a deconstruction that would like, in 
order to be consistent with itself, not to remain enclosed in purely 
speculative, theoretical academic discourses but rather … to aspire to 
something more consequential, to change things and to intervene in an 
efficient and responsible, though always, of course, very mediated way 
… Not doubtless to change things in the rather naive sense of calculated, 
deliberate and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of 
maximum intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of 
neither a simple symptom nor a simple cause (other categories are 
required here) 
(Derrida, 1992b, pp.8/9; italics in original). 
 
For me therefore, for political and ethical reasons, I would join Weiskopf and 
Willmott in urging deconstructive analyses to strive to address “as reflexively as 
possible, how particular representations come to be privileged and solidified” (1997, 
p.7; italics in original) in order to question, and where appropriate, work against such 
privileging.  As Derrida (1992b) puts it, to intensify transformational progress. 
Indeed, in the light of his pronouncement above and his other recent, strong and 
explicit invocations of emancipatory discourses this seems to me to be incumbent 
upon all of us who ‘use’ deconstruction. Derrida is rarely less equivocal: 
 
I refuse to denounce the great classical discourse of emancipation. I 
believe that there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, 
in all domains and all the areas of the world and society. Even if I would 
not wish to inscribe the discourse of emancipation into a teleology, a 
metaphysics, an eschatology, or even a classical messianism, I none the 
less believe that there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without 
what I would call a ‘Yes’ to emancipation  
(Derrida, 1996, p.82) 
 
 
THE END OF THE BOOK AND THE BEGINNING OF WRITING: DERRIDA 
AND EMANCIPATION IN ORGANIZING 
 
 
So, how might Derrida’s ideas be used to further the classical discourse of 
emancipation in an organizational context?  The oppression I am going to focus upon 
is the oppression of dominant language, arguing that this is one way in which 
deconstruction might change things in organizations.  At first glance, the oppression 
of language might appear to be trivial when compared to material or economic 
conditions (1). However, I will argue that dominant organizing practices can be 
understood to be oppressive because they rely upon understanding the enunciations of 
managers in a that way Derrida (1976) calls ‘the book’. I take this to mean reading 
these enunciations as we might an encyclopaedia - as meaningful and authoritative in 
that, like an encyclopaedia the enunciations refer beyond themselves to the ‘real 
world’ and invoke the real world as authority.  
 
Writers of the book in this sense are those who value truth as mimesis - they are not 
creators but transcribers, producing words that are to be believed in as much as they 
imitate ‘the real’. Read as a book, management language, in itself, ‘disappears’ from 
orthodox analysis because it is what is being imitated that is of interest. However, not 
only is it the case from a Derridean perspective that these management ‘truths’ make 
the world appear to be ‘this’ rather than ‘that’, as importantly in the context of 
emancipation in organizations, I argue that these truths are invariably ones which 
support the elites in charge of organizations and deny the interests of others.  
 
What is suggested as an emancipatory project is to start to read what managers say as 
a form of Derridean writing or text. In contrast to reading ‘the book’, an orientation to 
reading a ‘text’ in the special sense Derrida gives to this word, is a reading of 
language that is understood to be caught up with the ‘real’ rather than rigorously 
separate from it. Language and reality for Derrida are interdependent, woven together 
like coloured threads in text-ile. As Schalkwyk puts it, “It is this weave, this textile of 
two kinds of representation - reality and language in a continuous process of 
reiteration through time - that Derrida means by ‘the text’” (1997, p.387/8).    
 
Thus Thompson, in criticising Derrida: “[w]e could have a very interesting time 
deconstructing them [company mission statements], but the priority should be to 
investigate the gap between rhetoric and substance in areas such as equal 
opportunities” (1993, p.196/7) seems to me to have missed the central point of 
Derrida’s argument.  Derrida is far from suggesting that ‘substance’ does not matter; 
rather he suggests the impossibility of drawing a neat distinction between (to use 
Thompson’s terms) ‘rhetoric’ and ‘substance’.  Rather, language and substance are 
mutually constitutive, forming the Derridean ‘text’.    
 
Derrida, as we have seen, breaks radically with all ideas of truth as a description or 
reflection of things as they really are. As Howells says, all such theories of truth 
“imply an established world pre-existing perception and representation; but there is 
for Derrida no ‘world’ pre-existing the sign; the sign is constitutive of the world as we 
know it” (1998, p.76). Thus Derrida argues, 
 
The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is 
profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the encycopedic protection 
of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing, against 
its aphoristic energy, and … against difference in general 
 (Derrida, 1976, p.18)  
 
So, an emancipatory project following Derrida is to set oneself against the ‘book’ of 
management orthodoxy and show the aphoristic energy of rereading managers’ 
enunciations as writing or text in Derrida’s sense of these words. Such a reading will 
encourage us to stop treating management as unitary and more or less straightforward 
- to stop us reading the talk of managers as a common-sense representation of the 
organizational reality; but to see it as text - fragmentary, varied and unstable.    
 
These sorts of readings privilege the process in which organizational members are 
necessarily involved in what Chia memorably calls “reality-configuring-event-
structurings” (1997, p.700/701). Mainstream management theory can thus understood 
as merely one reality-configuring-event-structuring, and in so understanding it one 
can resist the way its cultural dominance has enabled it to give itself out as a book 
rather than a text - as the reality-configuring-event-structuring.  
 
Following Derrida (from his earlier work in which he links violence and metaphysics 
(1978, p.79-153) or elaborates the relationship between violence and the letter (1976, 
pp.101-140) to his later work on violence and the law (1992b)) I particularly want to 
raise the question of violence when communication is understood as the book rather 
than as writing. But ‘violence’ where the use of such a term is intended to be 
unorthodox and so particularly apparent. I raise issues of violence where it is not 
physical and where it is therefore rarely called by that name: violence in the domains 
of knowledge, thinking, writing and language (Grosz, 1998).    
 
What is of particular concern here is the violence in making what management ‘is’ 
seem to be relatively straightforward and obvious, thereby closing down the 
possibilities for us to think differently. Dominant ways of talking and arguing about 
organizing use a language that is the language of managerialism (Grey, 1999). The 
contribution of deconstruction to an emancipatory project is to disrupt and unsettle 
this language - to make it more apparent that language itself is the site of contestation 
rather than a neutral representational medium (Cooper, 1989).   
 
For Derrida, when ideas appear to be self-evident it is because the undecidability of 
language is being (violently) suppressed. His work is emancipatory in that it recalls 
and highlights such undecidability and in doing so challenges established, 
institutionalized interests. This style of thought is therefore one which actively 
encourages a commitment to valuing paradox, contrast and counterintuition (Kilduff  
& Mehra, 1997) never wanting to move from a mood of restlessness.   
 
A mood of restlessness is a mood that modes of analysis like that of Habermas wish to 
dispel, once the ‘truth’ about a problematic has been determined. In contrast, 
Derrida’s work has (at least in principle) what is for me the ‘check’ of being ever 
conscious of the precariousness of its own truth claims. Not because truth is denied 
but because it recognizes that there is always more truth - truth therefore always has 
to be on guard against itself.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The ethical and political benefit of deconstruction that is here being commended is to 
provide new languages of contestation to unsettle the manifestations of all too 
seductive (and sometimes insidious) managerialism. Derridean analysis can be used to 
unsettle conventional ways of reading organizational language, making the 
enunciations of managers the texts that they ‘write’ which are productive of meaning - 
rather than a book that imitates more or less unproblematically what is.  
 
In other words, the ambition is radically to question the supposed single ‘reality’ that 
managers arbitrarily carve out for us through their language.   That which might be 
assumed to be familiar and obvious is shown as able to be recast in unfamiliar ways to 
defamiliarize, estrange, denaturalise and unsettle that which we might otherwise take 
to be more or less clear, authoritative and stable in what it communicated (Learmonth, 
1999).   In particular, Derrida’s ideas represent a way of developing emancipatory 
modes of thinking for those who, like me, feel oppressed and marginalized in the one-
dimensional managerial world that such language appears to have constituted. What 
they do not do however is propose a vision of a utopian ‘emancipated’ world. 
Following Derrida, presenting such a vision would always and irredeemably be 
threatened and rendered paradoxical by the problematics of representation.  
 
Derrida’s point is that all authoritative claims, including those seeking to be 
emancipatory, need to be on guard against themselves. Even emancipatory discourses 
can tend towards totalitarianism if they conceal paradox and uncertainty and lend 
unwarranted authority to the author of such ‘answers’ - even as they masquerade as 
liberal and progressive (Willmott, 1998b). The nearest Derrida gets to a classical 
utopian discourse therefore is to suggest that emancipation is grounded in the 
preservation of the free questioning of everything - including what might count as 
emancipatory (Derrida, 2001) - all apparently straightforward answers deny the need 
for the restlessness in thinking which is being commended. What is being commended 
is a version of an emancipatory project Alvesson & Willmott call ‘questioning’: 
 
principally directed at challenging and critiquing dominant forms of 
thinking … The aim is to combat the self-evident and the taken for 
granted … Its intent is to doubt and resist authority (and its disciplining 
effects) without, necessarily, proposing an alternative agenda or set of 
prescriptions 
(Alvesson and Wilmott, 1996, p.176).  
 
In summary then, a deconstructive reassessment of emancipation and the political 
more generally, challenges us in particular not to be swayed by the violence that 
inheres within the assertion of decidable singularities - the violence that inheres in the 
claim that ‘what I say is this … ’. Deconstruction is a mode of reading designed to 
show how the world we think we find only gets (and has got) made in the shapes and 
terms that we take for granted as given, self-evident and natural (Meisel, 1995). 
Deconstruction is therefore an emancipatory critique in the sense that it enables us to 
see managers’ claims and practices in a new light so that, as Couzens Hoy (1993) 
argues, if we thereby come to deplore some of them, “we can try … to shake up ways 
of thinking sufficiently so that we can start to see what would be preferable instead” 
(p.251).  
Footnote 
 
1. To be clear, I do not wish to deny (sometimes extreme) economic and 
physical oppression in organizing processes.  I am (emphatically) not 
wishing to imply that such ‘macro-oppression’ is unimportant, indeed, 
quite the reverse. My focus here should not be taken to suggest these are 
unimportant, only that there are also other kinds of oppression. The 
oppression of language is more subtle (and therefore more likely to be 
missed).  Furthermore I submit, it is a form of oppression that academics 
have a realistic chance to influence. 
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